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BACKGROUND: The probability of a disease following a
diagnostic test depends on the sensitivity and specificity
of the test, but also on the prevalence of the disease in
the population of interest (or pre-test probability). How
physicians use this information is not well known.
OBJECTIVE: To assess whether physicians correctly
estimate post-test probability according to various
levels of prevalence and explore this skill across re-
spondent groups.
DESIGN: Randomized trial.
PARTICIPANTS: Population-based sample of 1,361
physicians of all clinical specialties.
INTERVENTION: We described a scenario of a highly
accurate screening test (sensitivity 99% and specificity
99%) in which we randomly manipulated the prevalence
of the disease (1%, 2%, 10%, 25%, 95%, or no
information).
MAIN MEASURES:We asked physicians to estimate the
probability of disease following a positive test (catego-
rized as <60%, 60–79%, 80–94%, 95–99.9%, and
>99.9%). Each answer was correct for a different
version of the scenario, and no answer was possible in
the “no information” scenario. We estimated the pro-
portion of physicians proficient in assessing post-test
probability as the proportion of correct answers beyond
the distribution of answers attributable to guessing.
KEY RESULTS: Most respondents in each of the six
groups (67%–82%) selected a post-test probability of
95–99.9%, regardless of the prevalence of disease and
even when no information on prevalence was provided.
This answer was correct only for a prevalence of 25%.
We estimated that 9.1% (95% CI 6.0–14.0) of respon-
dents knew how to assess correctly the post-test
probability. This proportion did not vary with clinical
experience or practice setting.
CONCLUSIONS: Most physicians do not take into
account the prevalence of disease when interpreting a
positive test result. This may cause unnecessary testing
and diagnostic errors.
KEY WORDS: Bayes’ theorem; predictive value of tests; prevalence;
sensitivity and specificity; diagnosis; risk assessment; probability;
evidence-based medicine.
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INTRODUCTION
Estimating the probability of a disease following a diagnostic
test is a basic clinical skill that guides treatment decisions and
investigation strategies. According to Bayes’ theorem, the post-
test probability depends on the specificity and the sensitivity of
the test, and on the prevalence of the disease in the population
of interest (i.e., pre-test probability)1.
Updating disease probability estimates based on test results
is not intuitive1–4. Many physicians misunderstand basic
concepts of test accuracy5–8, whether they are presented as
sensitivity and specificity, likelihood ratios, or graph displays6.
Another difficulty lies in estimating pre-test probabilities9,10.
How physicians use available information about disease
prevalence is not well known. A previous study has suggested
that post-test probability is generally overestimated, especially
when disease prevalence is low, but this study was limited by a
small and selected sample of physicians, and by a narrow
range of disease prevalence5. No study was able to determine
the proportion of physicians who are proficient in estimating
post-test probability according to prevalence.
In this study, we explored whether physicians’ estimates of
post-test probability vary with disease prevalence in a hypo-
thetical diagnostic situation. We also estimated the proportion
of physicians who can correctly apply Bayes’ theorem in
deriving the post-test probability and explored whether this
skill varies with sociodemographic characteristics, practice
setting, or clinical experience.
METHODS
Study Design and Subjects
We conducted a mail survey among physicians of all clinical
specialties working in Geneva, Switzerland, whether prac-
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ticing in a public hospital or in private practice, either still
in training or board certified. Participants were identified
from two databases, one including most private practi-
tioners in Geneva, the other comprising all salaried staff at
the Geneva University Hospitals. After exclusion of duplicate
records and physicians who did not work with patients (e.g.,
pathologists, public health specialists, etc.), we sent the
survey package to 2,745 eligible participants on October
2007, with up to two reminders in the next 4 months. This
study was approved by the Research Ethics Committee of
Geneva University Hospitals.
Questionnaire
The questionnaire assessed doctors’ opinions on various
practice-related issues, which are not analyzed in this paper.
Respondents were also asked to report on their age, sex, year
of birth, year of graduation, specialty (either completed or
planned), and practice setting (private practice or public
hospital practice).
In addition, the survey included the following hypothetical
vignette (translated from French):
“As a school doctor, you perform a screening test
for a viral disease in a primary school. The
properties of the test are very good:
& among 100 children who have the disease, the test is
positive in 99, and falsely negative in only 1, and
& among 100 children who do not have the disease, the test is
negative in 99, and falsely positive in only 1.
On average, about x % of children are infected
without knowing it.”
This vignette was produced in six different versions, in
which the prevalence of the disease took the following
values: 1%, 2%, 10%, 25%, and 95%; the sixth version gave
no information on prevalence. Each participant was ran-
domized to receive only one of the six versions of the
vignette and was blinded to the existence of alternative
versions. At the end of the vignette, respondents were asked
the following multiple-choice question: “If the test for one of
the children is positive, what is the probability that he
actually has this viral disease?” Possible answers were on
a five-point scale: (1) <60%, (2) 60–79%, (3) 80–94%, (4) 95–
99.9%, and (5) >99.9%. For each version, one option was the
correct post-test probability. This correct answer depended
only on the parameters described in the vignette, namely:
the sensitivity, specificity, and disease prevalence. Indeed,
the post-test probability was 50.0% for a prevalence of 1%,
66.9% for a prevalence of 2%, 91.7% for 10%, 97.1% for
25%, and 99.95% for a prevalence of 95% (Fig. 1). No
answer was possible in the “no information” scenario. We
did not explicitly name sensitivity and specificity, but rather
expressed them as natural frequencies11, in order to over-
come possible misunderstandings about their definitions12.
We described a hypothetical disease to avoid the bias of
previous knowledge. The vignette was pre-tested for under-
standing and readability in face-to-face interviews with 15
physicians before the survey.
Statistical Analysis
We compared respondents who answered the vignette with
those who skipped it but filled out the rest of the question-
naire. Then we compared the six groups of patients randomly
allocated to the different versions of the vignette.
We examined the frequency distributions of estimated post-
test probabilities across versions of the vignette (Table 1,
correct answers are marked with an *). We hypothesized that
our sample is composed of two populations: (1) those who
knew how to estimate post-test probability and all of whom
answered correctly, and (2) those who did not know but could
answer correctly by chance. We sought to estimate the
proportion of respondents in the first population. To do so,
we performed a median polish of the column proportions of our
data (Table 1, excluding the subgroup without information on
prevalence). Median polish is an exploratory data analysis
technique for two-way tables, described by Tukey13. It is
similar to a two-way ANOVA, but uses medians instead of
means, which makes it robust to outliers. This is an important
property, as we expected one outlier per row and per column,
the correct answer. This procedure removes the row effect of a
table (i.e., the observed distribution of post-test probability
estimates independent of the version of the vignette) and the
column effect (i.e., the effect due to each different version), and
yields residual proportions (see online appendix for details). We
hypothesized that there would be only one larger residual for
each version of the vignette, corresponding to the correct
answer, which captures the proportion of respondents who
correctly estimate post-test probability beyond the distribution
of answers attributable to guessing. We computed the median
Figure 1. Probability modifying plot: relationship between pre-test
probability (i.e., prevalence of a disease) and post-test probability, for
a positive diagnostic test with 99% of sensitivity and specificity. The
diamonds show the post-test probabilities corresponding to the
different values of prevalence that were randomly manipulated in our
questionnaire. This relationship is described by the following equation:
Post test probability ¼ Sensitivity  PrevalenceðSensitivity  PrevalenceÞþð1 SpecificityÞ  ð1 PrevalenceÞ
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of these five residuals as the overall proportion of physicians
proficient in estimating post-test probability. The 95% confi-
dence interval on this proportion was obtained by non
parametric bootstrap (bias-corrected and accelerated boot-
strap, 10,000 iterations)14. Finally, we explored this proportion
and its 95% confidence interval across subgroups of respon-
dents. Descriptive analyses were performed with SPSS 15.0
software. Median polish and bootstrap were performed using R
2.9.215.
RESULTS
Sample Characteristics
Of 2,745 eligible physicians, 1,544 (56.2%) returned complet-
ed questionnaires, and 1,361 (88.1% of 1,544) answered the
diagnostic vignette and were included in the analysis. Vi-
gnette respondents were younger than the 183 non-respon-
dents (mean age 46.6 vs 52.5 years, p<0.001) and had more
recently graduated (mean number of years 20.0 vs 24.2 p<
0.001). A higher proportion was in training (35.0% vs 19.7%,
p<0.001) and worked as primary care physicians (38.3 vs
29.5, p=0.01). Respondents’ characteristics are shown in
Table 2, column 1.
There were no differences among the six groups of physi-
cians allocated to the different versions of the vignette in terms
of response rate and for all covariates tested (data not shown,
available upon request).
Clinical Diagnostic Vignette
The distribution of post-test probability estimates was similar
among the five groups of physicians allocated to the different
versions of the vignette that provided information on disease
prevalence (Table 1). A majority of respondents (between
66.7% and 80.3% across versions) selected a post post-test
probability of 95–99.9% regardless of the prevalence of
disease. This answer was correct for a prevalence of 25%
and incorrect in all other groups. The same distribution was
observed in the sixth group, which received no information on
prevalence.
A slightly higher proportion of respondents selected the
correct answer in each of the five groups where information on
prevalence was provided (correct answers are marked with an *
in Table 1). The proportion of correct answers varied across the
versions from 5.7% to 20.4%, except in the version with a
prevalence of 25%, where 80.3% of respondents selected the
correct post-test probability of 95–99.9%.
Using Tukey’s median polish, we estimated that the propor-
tion of respondents who knew how to estimate post-test
probability was 9.1% (95% CI 6.0–14.0; see online appendix).
This proportion did not substantially vary according to sex,
age, number of years after graduation, clinical specialty, or
practice setting (Table 2, column 2). Primary care physicians
Table 1. Answer Frequencies (and Column %) in the Five Proposed Categories of Post-test Probability According to the Prevalence of the
Disease (Pre-test Probability)
Post-test probability Prevalence of the disease (randomized by group of physicians)
1% 2% 10% 25% 95% Not mentioned Total
>99.9% 28 (13.1) 20 (8.7) 30 (13.0) 22 (9.6) 46 (20.4)* 35 (15.0) 181 (13.3)
95 to 99.9% 150 (70.4) 184 (80.3) 154 (66.7) 184 (80.3)* 160 (71.1) 191 (81.6) 1,023 (75.2)
80 to 94% 7 (3.3) 5 (2.2) 37 (16.0)* 7 (3.1) 12 (5.3) 4 (1.7) 72 (5.3)
60 to 79% 2 (0.9) 13 (5.7)* 2 (0.9) 11 (4.8) 1 (0.4) 1 (0.4) 30 (2.2)
<60% 26 (12.2)* 7 (3.1) 8 (3.5) 5 (2.2) 6 (2.7) 3 (1.3) 55 (4.0)
Total 213 (100.0) 229 (100.0) 231 (100.0) 229 (100.0) 225 (100.0) 234 (100.0) 1,361 (100.0)
*For a test with 99% sensitivity and specificity (i.e., likelihood ratio of 99), correct answers are marked with an * (i.e., for a prevalence of 1% the post-test
probability is 50.0%, for a prevalence of 2% → 66.9%, for a prevalence of 10% → 91.7%, for a prevalence of 25% → 97.1%, and for a prevalence of for
95% → 99.95%)
Table 2. Respondents’ Characteristics and Estimated Proportion of
Physicians that Correctly Assess Post-test Probability Across
Subgroups of Respondents
N* (column %) Proportion of
physicians that
skilfully estimate
post-test probability
% [95% CI]§
All respondents 1,361 (100%) 9.1 [6.0 to 14.0]
Sex
Female 520 (38.2) 9.0 [5.6 to 17.7]
Male 841 (61.8) 8.9 [4.4 to 14.8]
Age
≤35 years 288 (21.3) 7.6 [2.4 to 16.1]
36–50 years 551 (40.5) 9.8 [4.1 to 17.3]
>50 years 521 (38.3) 4.4 [0.0 to 8.7]
Practice setting
Private practice 748 (55.0) 7.2 [3.9 to 12.7]
Public hospital, in training 477 (35.0) 9.8 [5.8 to 18.8]
Public hospital, senior 136 (10.0) 11.0 [0.0 to 19.2]
Specialty
Primary care physicians† 519 (38.3) 12.4 [7.5 to 21.1]
Internal medicine specialists 208 (15.3) 5.1 [0 to 15.2]
Technical specialists‡ 392 (28.9) 6.8 [3.1 to 14.3]
Psychiatrists 237 (17.5) 5.4 [0.0 to 13.3]
Number of years after diploma
≤10 years 357 (26.5) 6.7 [1.5 to 12.8]
11–20 years 347 (25.8) 8.4 [1.3 to 15.7]
21–30 years 394 (29.3) 7.7 [1.0 to 13.4]
>30 years 247 (18.4) 8.0 [4.1 to 21.2]
*The total can be different from N=1361 because of missing values
ranging from 0 to 16
†Including general practitioners, general internists, and paediatricians
‡Including surgeons, gynecologists and obstetricians, anesthesiologists,
ENT, ophthalmologists, radiologists, and dermatologists
§Computed among the 1,127 respondents who received information on
prevalence. See methods for a detailed explanation of this estimation.
Confidence intervals (CI) were obtained by non-parametric bias corrected
and accelerated bootstrap
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performed slightly better (12.4%) compared to other specialties
(5.1 to 6.8%), but all confidence intervals overlapped widely.
DISCUSSION
Most physicians did not use information about the prevalence
of the disease correctly when interpreting a positive result of a
diagnostic test. In a scenario that described a highly accurate
screening test (sensitivity 99% and specificity 99%), most
selected a post post-test probability of 95–99.9%, regardless
of the prevalence of disease. The same distribution was found
when no information on prevalence was provided, even though
it is impossible to derive the post-test probability in this case.
Overall, only about one out of ten physicians knew how to
correctly assess post-test probability, a proportion that did not
vary significantly across subgroups of respondents.
Comparison with Other Studies
In an earlier study, 31 physicians and 19 non-physicians at a
university hospital evaluated the post-test probability of
disease based on three levels of prevalence (0.001%, 0.1%,
and 10%)5. The respondents generally overestimated post-test
probability. Our results are compatible with this finding. In
addition, by manipulating disease prevalence over a wider
range, we were able to show that physicians not only
overestimate post-test probabilities, but that a large majority
actually ignore information on prevalence.
Three other studies confirm that doctors are not very good
at estimating post-test probabilities. Only 22% of Swiss
general practitioners chose the correct range of post-test
probability (<25%) when presented with a positive screening
test (sensitivity and specificity of 95%) and a disease preva-
lence of 1%8, and only 17% of US pediatricians estimated a
nearly correct post-test probability when faced with a nega-
tive test result (sensitivity 50% and specificity 95%) and a
disease prevalence of 30%7. In a third study conducted
among US students, house officers, and physicians, more
than 50% largely overestimated post-test probability (>50%,
the correct answer being 9%) when presented with a positive
screening test (sensitivity and specificity of 95%) and a
disease prevalence of 0.5%16. These results are more favor-
able than our estimate of 9% of physicians proficient in
estimating post-test probability, but they do not account for
responding correctly by chance, as they did not manipulate
disease prevalence.
Interpretation of the Results and Implications
What might be the reasons for such poor performance among
physicians? Firstly, some doctors may not know that post-test
probability depends on disease prevalence. This is corroborat-
ed by our finding that most physicians who were given no
information on prevalence still guessed at post-test probabil-
ities, although it is impossible in this case.
A second explanation is that physicians misunderstand basic
notions of test accuracy12,17. Most respondents selected a post
post-test probability of 95–99.9%, perhaps because they con-
fused post-test probability with sensitivity or specificity. Such
confusion is reflected by the inconsistency of the language used
everyday to express diagnostic reasoning17.
Thirdly, physicians may have difficulties with the arith-
metic component of post-test probability estimation1,4. Two
main strategies can be used to reach a correct estimate. One
relies on the direct application of Bayes’ theorem. Prevalence
is converted into pre-test odds [odds = prevalence/(1-
prevalence)], and the positive likelihood ratio is obtained
from test characteristics [LR of a positive test = sensitivity/
(1-specificity)]. The product of pre-test odds and the LR is
the post-test odds, which are then converted into post-test
probability [probability = odds/(1 + odds)]. An alternative
strategy is to construct a two-way contingency table, with
an arbitrary total number of patients (e.g., 10,000), and
estimate each cell from the prevalence and test character-
istics. Post-test probability is then obtained by dividing the
number of true positives by the number of all positive
tests11,18. Fagan’s nomogram19, computer software or hand-
held devices can be used as effective shortcuts for these
computations. Given our mail survey approach, participants
in our study would have had the opportunity to use these
aids or even to look for assistance on how to provide the
correct answer. A similar study in a classroom or specific
practice setting may thus have shown an even lower
proportion of correct answers, which would only reinforce
our conclusions regarding the inability of physicians to
correctly estimate post-test probability.
Given the recent emphasis on clinical epidemiology and
evidence-based medicine in medical curricula, one could
hypothesize that more recently trained physicians would be
more proficient at estimating post-test probability. This was
not confirmed by our results. Moreover, two studies conducted
among medical students suggested that traditional teaching of
Bayesian reasoning may not be effective enough in improving
diagnostic performance18,20.
Conversely, Bayesian skills might be acquired through
clinical experience, i.e., through regular exposure to the
interpretation of diagnostic tests3,21,22. However, we found
that more experienced physicians did not perform better.
Clinical experience may improve the estimation of pre-test
probability at the bedside, but does not lead to an accurate
application of Bayes’ rule.
Does the inability to correctly estimate post-test probability
affect patient care? This depends on the clinical decision that
follows this estimation. We did not investigate this relation-
ship, but an earlier study showed that post-test probability
estimates were indeed associated with subsequent intended
management 7. An important barrier to clinicians using Bayes’
theorem may be that many correct diagnoses and decisions
can be made using non-probabilistic, yet effective cognitive
processes, both analytical4,23 and non-analytical 24,25. However,
diagnostic errors remain common, as they range from <5% in
radiological or pathological specialties up to 10–15% in most
other clinical fields24. Inaccurate probability estimation is con-
sidered a substantial contributor to these errors 4,10,23,26,27. In
light of our results and of previous work, increased risk of
diagnostic error and unnecessary testing may result either from
the overestimation of positive predictive value when pre-test
376 Agoritsas et al.: Post-test Probability According to Prevalence JGIM
probability is low (as in our scenario) or the overestimation
of negative predictive value when pre-test probability is
high. Of course, clinical decisions rarely depend on the
interpretation of a single test, many tests provide more
information than the presence or absence of a disease (e.g.,
imaging procedures)1, and complex clinical decisions gener-
ally involve more than one clinician or specialist23. Never-
theless, in several clinical situations incorrect post-test
estimation would still result in unnecessary testing, in-
creased patient anxiety, and diagnostic errors2,4,10,20. Final-
ly, poor understanding of probability thinking may also lead
to the inability to interpret and make use of available
evidence on new diagnostic procedures correctly4,28.
Study Limitations and Strengths
The main limitation of our study is that the evidence is
based on a hypothetical vignette. Although vignette studies
are used increasingly to assess physician practice variation
in diagnostic and treatment decisions6–8,29, they constitute
a simplification of real clinical practice. On the other hand,
the correct answer to our multiple-choice vignette depends
only on the parameters presented (namely: the sensitivity,
specificity, and disease prevalence) and should not be
influenced by the clinical context. Moreover, the use of a
hypothetical vignette allowed us to isolate specific aspects
of diagnostic testing29, in this case the prevalence of
disease, which cannot be manipulated in real clinical
situations, at least not over a wide range. A better
identification of specific barriers in the evidence-based
diagnosis is essential, as most attempts to improve it have
remained unsuccessful4,7,20.
Another limitation is possible selection bias. Although
typical for physicians’ surveys30, we obtained a moderate
response rate of 56%, which may affect absolute estimates of
physicians’ abilities. However, it is unlikely that selection bias
would influence the comparisons of the randomly assigned
values of prevalence, as response rate was comparable across
the different versions of the scenario.
As with any local study, generalizability to other contexts
is uncertain. In particular, physicians’ proficiency may
differ according to their specific training. Yet, contemporary
Swiss medical curricula and residency programs are com-
parable to those of many other countries, especially in their
emphasis on clinical epidemiology and evidence-based
medicine. Moreover, among the studies on probability
estimation that we discussed above, three used physician
samples from the USA and showed fairly comparable
performance5,7,16. For these reasons, we believe our results
are generalizable.
The main strength of this study is the random manipula-
tion of disease prevalence on a wide range of values, which
yielded a comprehensive perspective on how this informa-
tion is used—or in this case, ignored—by physicians. This
also allowed us to estimate the overall proportion of
physicians who are proficient in estimating post-test prob-
ability. Finally, we surveyed a large population-based sample
of physicians, from various clinical specialties, practice
settings, and clinical experience, in contrast with previous
research on post-test probability estimation5–8,16.
Conclusion and Future Prospects
We found that most physicians did not use prevalence of
disease when they estimated post-test probability, indepen-
dently of clinical experience, practice setting, or recent
exposure to teaching in evidence-based diagnosis. This may
cause unnecessary testing and diagnostic errors. Regular
training is probably needed to improve familiarity with
probabilistic diagnostic reasoning. Further research should
explore novel approaches to help physicians implement
Bayes’ rule in clinical practice. Wider use of graphical
presentations of diagnostic information31, testing of new
didactic models18,32, and development of computerized
knowledge resources for evidence-based diagnosis4 are ave-
nues for further study.
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